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Priority No. 4 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Did the Utah State Bar have jurisdiction to hold 
disciplinary proceedings on Appellant in F-198? 
2. Is the Utah State Bar's recommendation of 
disbarment excessive and inequitable? 
In Re: 
JOHN S. DAVIS 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
Case No. 870051 
Priority No. 4 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal of the recommendation of the Utah 
State Bar, by and through its Board of Bar Commissioners, 
that Appellant be disbarred. 
In November 1982 Appellant was convicted of second 
degree felony theft, for which he was sentenced as a third 
degree felony. In March 1983 Appellant was placed on 
Interim Suspension, pending completion of disciplinary 
action. In May 1986 a disciplinary trial was held and in 
November 1986 the hearing panel issued its Findings, 
Conclusions and Recommendations to the Board of Bar 
Commissioners, which affirmed them in January 1987. 
Since February 5, 1987, those Findings, Conclusions and 
Recommendation of Disbarment have been pending in this 
court. It is from that recommendation and underlying 
findings that this appeal has been taken by Appellant. 
In Re: 
JOHN S. DAVIS 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
In October 1982 Appellant was convicted by a jury of 
Theft, a Second Degree Felony, in the Fourth Judicial 
District Court of the State of Utah in and for Utah County 
(R. 19)- On November 26, 1982, Judge Don Tibbs entered the 
conviction as a Third Degree Felony and placed Appellant on 
probation. (R. 14 of F-198) The conviction was based upon 
evidence that in 1979 Appellant diverted to his own use 
approximately $73,279.45 that belonged to his clients, 
Charley Joseph and Joseph Mascaro, who were investment 
partners in a real estate venture. (R. 13 of F-198) In 1980 
Appellant was sued by Mascaro and another to recover their 
share of the $141,037.09 paid by Chatillon, Inc., to 
Appellant, who received the money as attorney for the 
investment partnership and who had diverted and spent the 
bulk of it as his own. (R. 09 of F-198) 
In connection with that litigation Appellant was 
deposed in June 1981 and stated under oath that he was still 
holding the money received from Chatillon in his trust 
account, whose location he refused to disclose. (R. 09 of 
F-198, Exhibit 5) Eventually the civil trial court ordered 
disclosure of Appellant's bank records. Contrary to what 
Appellant had represented, the funds received from Chatillon 
had been fully exhausted. (R. 09 of F-198) (For greater 
detail of these facts that underlie the criminal conduct and 
the civil action, see a copy of the 1984 Utah Supreme Court 
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decision affirming the criminal conviction and a subsequent 
related appeal attached as Addendum A.) 
Contemporaneous with the criminal action was a 
complaint filed with the Utah State Bar by Charley Joseph in 
January 1982. (R. 98 of F-137) The ensuing Bar complaint 
alleged illegal conduct involving moral turpitude [DR 
1-102(A)(3)] and misconduct in failing to pay a client 
monies held by Appellant and requested by the client and 
failing to properly account for client funds [DR 
9-102(B)(3&4)]. (R.96 of F-137) (See Addendum B) 
A Screening Panel of the Ethics and Discipline 
Committee determined that a Formal Complaint should issue 
and F-137 was filed (R. 10 of F-137)(Addendum C), alleging 
violations of Rule III and Rule IV of the Procedures of 
Discipline (See Addendum D for pertinent Rules) and 
subsections (5) and (6) of DR 1-102(A), in addition to those 
previously alleged. (See Addendum D for pertinent Rule and 
DR violations) 
On motion of the Bar Counsel, for the Ethics and 
Discipline Committee and the Board of Bar Commissioners, 
Appellant was placed in Interim Suspension by this court 
March 7, 1983. (R. 29 of F-137) 
Subsequently in January 1984, Bar Counsel was permitted 
to file an Amended Complaint (R. 35 of F-137)(Addendum E), 
which left the original allegations of F-137 as Count I, but 
as a result of Appellant's criminal conviction, added Count 
II, alleging Appellant had now violated Rule II, Section 4 
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and Canon 1, DR 1-102(A)(4) of the Revised Rules of 
Professional Conduct, Rule 11(a) of the Procedures of 
Discipline, and Rule C, paragraph 23 of the Rules for 
Integration and Management of the Utah State Bar. (See 
Addendum F for Integration Rule) 
Pursuant to a January 31, 1985, Order of Hearing Panel 
Chairman Gerald Kinghorn, Bar Counsel referred Count II of 
Amended F-137 to a Screening Panel for its consideration, as 
the Ethics and Discipline Committee had not reviewed those 
allegations before they were added to F-137. (R. 150 of 
F-137)(See Addendum G) A Formal Complaint was voted by the 
Ethics and Discipline Committee and it was issued as F-190. 
On stipulation of Appellant and Bar Counsel, F-190 was 
dismissed without prejudice in April 1985 (R. 27-28 of 
F-198)(Addendum H) and reissued in proper form as F-198, 
still alleging only violations related to Appellant's 
criminal conviction. (R. 24 of F-198)(Addendum I) 
As a result of the January 31, 1985, Order, the Hearing 
Panel dismissed Count II of Amended F-137 and granted Bar 
Counsel's Motion to Consolidate F-137 with F-198, as F-198 
alleged the misconduct formerly contained in Count II of 
Amended F-137. (R. 161, 164 of F-198) 
Approximately one month prior to the disciplinary trial 
of May 15, 1986, Bar Counsel dismissed Count I of F-137, the 
only remaining count in that Formal Complaint. (R. 231 of 
F-137) On November 18, 1986, the Disciplinary Hearing Panel 
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entered its Findings, Conclusions, and Recommendation of 
Disbarment over the signatures of its three members, Gerald 
H. Kinghorn, Randon W. Wilson, and E. Allan Hunter. (R. 267 
of F-137)(Addendum J) 
Subsequently the Board of Bar Commissioners affirmed 
and adopted those Findings, Conclusions and Recommendations, 
which were filed February 5, 1987, with this court. (R. 272 
of F-137) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The Utah State Bar did have jurisdiction over Appellant 
in F-198. This court's Order of Interim Suspension did not 
act as a bar to any subsequent disciplinary action against 
Appellant. 
Rule 41(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is not 
sound authority for Appellant's proposition that 
jurisdiction over him was lost by prior dismissals of 
similar allegations. The rules of evidence and procedure 
applicable to the conduct of non-jury civil trials apply 
only to the actual hearing on the Formal Complaint, not to 
all stages of the proceeding. Therefore, a disciplinary 
trial is a unique entity, not suited by its purpose to be 
perfectly analogous to civil trials. 
The recommendation of disbarment is not excessive under 
the facts of this case and Appellant ought not receive 




THE UTAH STATE BAR HAD JURISDICTION OVER APPELLANT 
WHEN F-198 WAS ISSUED. 
In 1985 Rule 111(g) of the Procedures of Discipline of 
the Utah State Bar defined "member of the Bar' as "an 
attorney in good standing on the official roster of 
attorneys of the Supreme Court of Utah and the Utah State 
Bar," Rule VIII(a) provided then and now that "a 
disciplinary proceeding may be initiated against any member 
of the bar." Clearly the intent of Rule VIII is not served 
by the interpretation of these rules urged by Appellant, 
that he is immune from bar prosecution because he was not "a 
member in good standing" by dint of his interim suspension 
status. 
In any event Appellant misconstrues Rule 
VII(b). (Addendum K) That section is a description of the 
sanction of suspension that is the culmination of a 
discipline proceeding against an attorney, where a 
Disciplinary Hearing Panel and the Board of Bar 
Commissioners have considered the matter and have made 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Recommendations of 
Discipline. The sanction of suspension, which may be for 
any period not to exceed two years, can only be ordered by 
the Utah Supreme Court after it has reviewed the record 
pursuant to Rules XIII and XIV of the Procedures of 
Discipline. 
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Interim Suspension, defined in Rule VII(b)(l-5), is a 
different kind of suspension. It is not a subset of the 
Suspension described in VII(b) but a unique status which may 
be order before the disciplinary process is concluded, prior 
to consideration of the misconduct by the Screening Panel of 
the Ethics and Discipline Committee or a Disciplinary 
Hearing Panel. 
A suspension under VII(b) can be stayed by the court 
but interim suspension under VII(b) cannot. It is a 
mechanism to swiftly remove an attorney from the practice of 
law in order to protect the public prior to imposition of a 
sanction, which may or may not ultimately be suspension. 
(Temporary conditions of probation are also authorized by 
this section if such are needed to protect the public during 
the pendency of the disciplinary action.) The language of 
VII(b)(l) contemplates that such petitions may be prior to, 
concurrent with, or subsequent to the filing of Findings, 
Conclusions, and a Recommendation of Discipline with the 
court. 
Consequently Appellant's reliance of his lack of good 
standing to fend off the imposition of a sanction by this 
court is misplaced. His interim suspension was merely his 
removal from the practice of law during the course of the 
disciplinary process; it was not a disciplinary sanction. 
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POINT II 
JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH STATE BAR WAS NOT LOST BY 
THE PRIOR DISMISSALS OF THE ALLEGATIONS OF 
APPELLANT'S CRIMINAL CONVICTION. 
Appellant claims that the Utah State Bar no longer has 
jurisdiction to prosecute him for his felony conviction 
because similar action against Appellant had previously been 
voluntarily dismissed. Appellant is wrong. Count II of 
F-137 was dismissed by the Disciplinary Hearing Panel (R. 
161 of F-198), not by Bar Counsel, although he had filed a 
Motion to Dismiss. The Panel's Order was in response to 
Appellant's motion to strike that allegation as he had not 
had it considered by a Screening Panel and it was improperly 
included in the Formal Complaint. F-190 was expressly 
dismissed upon stipulation of the parties "without 
prejudice" so that Bar Counsel could return the matter to a 
Screening Panel for a proper determination. (See Addendum I) 
This factual dispute aside, Appellant misapplies Rule 
XII(b) of the Procedures of Discipline by attempting to 
extend it beyond its defined limits — the "hearing on a 
Formal Complaint." (Addendum L) Pre-trial motions and the 
significance thereof are not part of the hearing, which is 
the actual disciplinary trial and which is the only 
disciplinary procedure that must be reported electronically 
or stenographically. Rule XII(b) gives notice to the 
parties and the Disciplinary Hearing Panel of the character 
of the proceeding and the rules that will govern 
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admissibility of evidence. For example it puts an accused 
attorney on notice that he may be called to testify by the 
prosecutor, a procedure impermissible if the Rules of 
Criminal Procedure were followed. 
Appellant's argument is flawed because he has a 
fundamental misunderstanding of the purpose of the attorney 
discipline process. The goal is not winning. The 
objectives are to protect the public and to ensure the 
integrity of the profession. Rule 1(a) of the Procedures of 
Discipline states it thusly: 
"The purpose of the attorney disciplinary proceedings 
is to ensure and maintain the high standard of professional 
conduct required of those who undertake the discharge of 
professional responsibilities as members of the Utah State 
Bar, and to protect the public and the administration of 
justice from those who have demonstrated by their conduct 
that they are unable or likely to be unable to properly 
discharge their public trust as attorneys and counselors." 
Rule 1(c) also makes it clear that "the rules are to be 
construed so as to achieve the spirit of professional 
discipline of the Utah State Bar, and to effect substantial 
justice and fairness." These objectives would be undermined 
by Appellant's technical argument, and the interest of 
justice ill-served by a finding that a convicted thief could 
hereby escape accountability to his profession. 
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In Re Strong, 616 P.2d 583, 585 (Utah 1980) set forth 
the unique nature of the disciplinary proceedings: "Thus, 
the preservation of the integrity of the courts and the 
safety of the public must rise above the strict technical 
rules of evidence that govern the usual adversary 
proceedings between individuals. This is not a proceeding 
to determine conflicting claims of right where one party 
prevails over the other." 
POINT III 
THE RECOMMENDATION OF DISBARMENT IS APPROPRIATE. 
Appellant argues that because he has been on interim 
suspension for four years that disbarment would be unduly 
harsh. He correctly claims that a minimum of nine years 
will have to have passed from the date of his interim 
suspension before he can apply for readmission. While it 
may be true that in some circumstances such a sanction would 
be excessive, this is not such a case. 
Appellant has been convicted of felony theft, a crime 
of moral turpitude. See In Re Pearce, 136 P.2d 969, 971 
(Utah 1943); In the Matter of Charles W. Colson, 412 A.2d 
1160, 1168 (1979); In Re Alvin E. Honoroff, 126 Cal. Rptr. 
229, 543 P.2d 597 (1975). He stole approximately $73,000 
from his clients, an action that is particularly repugnant 
because it shattered a bond of professional and fiduciary 
trust. Then he lied under oath about the preservation of 
that money in trust accounts, further evidence of his lack 
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of moral fitness to practice law. (See Statement of Facts) 
Appellant produced no mitigation for the Disciplinary Panel. 
In In Re James Murrell Jones, 696 P.2d 1215 (Utah 1985) 
this court disbarred an attorney for his conviction of two 
counts of felony theft by deception, where no evidence in 
mitigation was presented or found. In a concurring opinion 
Associate Chief Justice I. Daniel Stewart expressed his view 
and that of Justice Zimmerman that the automatic disbarment 
authorized by Rule 23 of the Rules for Integration and 
Management of the Utah State Bar ought to be reserved for 
felonies that are malum in se., of which theft by deception 
is one. Even under that restriction, disbarment is the only 
appropriate sanction in this case under the circumstances of 
Appellant's conviction for felony theft. 
While delay in this matter was regrettable, it was 
occasioned both by the actions of Bar Counsel and of 
Appellant, who filed numerous motions throughout these 
proceedings, including, but not limited to, motions to hold 
in abeyance, motions to extend the time for discovery, and a 
petition for an interlocutory appeal. (R. 74, R. 168 and R. 
194 of F-137) Given the egregiousness of Appellant's 
conduct, the interests of the public, the profession, and 
justice would not be served by allowing Appellant any 
consideration now for his period of interim suspension. 
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CONCLUSION 
Appellant has attempted to distort the Procedures of 
Discipline and obscure their logical, clear meaning and 
application. He has received every consideration during the 
discipline process, as attested by the voluminous record, 
and now ought to be fully accountable for his misconduct. 
Respondent urges the court to accept the Recommendation 
of the Board of Bar Commissioners that Appellant be 
disbarred and his name stricken from the roster of 
attorneys. 
Respectfully submitted this A " ^ day of October, 
1987. 
Jo/Carol Nesset-Sale 
tto A rney for Respondent 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I, Jo Carol Nesset-Sale, hereby certify that four true 
and exact copies of the foregoing Brief were mailed, postage 
pre-paid, to John S. Davis, 1068 North Grand Circle, Provo, 
Utah 84604, this /b day of October, 1987. 
Delivered by /^yCj^j^^/T"^'Av^LO this _JJ_ 
day of October , 1987/ 
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ADDENDUM A 
^ O N . JJ<jr* v . ± x o»^ 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
David L. WJ U r n 
ooOoo D*ve B' T h o m ^ ° * 
NoaJl T. WooLto. 
tor Respondent 
State of Utah, No. 18892 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
F I L E D 
v . J u n e 2 5 , 1984 
John Shepard Davis, 
Defendant and Appellant* Geoffrey J. Butler, Clerk 
HALL, Chief Justice: 
Ronald R. Stange 
for Appellanc 
This1is an appeal from a third degree felony convic-
tion of theft. Defendant assigns the following as error: 
(1)' insufficiency of the evidence; (2) denial of his motion to 
waive a jury trial; (3) admission of improper evidence during 
the State's rebuttal argument; and (4) inclusion of a partial 
written deposition in the evidence which the jury was permitted 
to take with them into their place of deliberation. 
In 1978, Joseph Mascaro and Charley Joseph became 
investment partners for the purpose of purchasing options on two 
adjacent parcels of real property located in"Utah County. While 
holding said options, Mascaro and Joseph (hereinafter the 
"partnership11) initiated a sale of both parcels to Paul Tanner, 
who intended to develop the lots into a subdivision. Prior to 
the consummation of that sale, however, the term of the options 
expired and Tanner was able to negotiate a direct purchase on 
the larger of the two parcels (consisting of approximately 130 
acres) from Stan Logan, the former owner thereof. The partner-
ship was able to renew its option on the smaller 18-acre parcel, 
which it then exercised by purchasing the said parcel on uniform 
real estate contract for $117,000. Inasmuch as this smaller 
parcel provided access to the larger parcel purchased by Tanner, 
it was essential to Tanner's proposed development. Tanner 
therefore purchased the smaller parcel from the partnership on, 
uniform real estate contract at a price of 3165,000. He paid 
340,000 down on the contract, but was unable thereafter to 
obtain the necessary financing to pay off the 3125,000 balance. 
In December of 1978, defendant John Davis, an attor-
ney, was hired by the partnership to collect the balance owing 
l.:eIn violation of U.C.A., 1953, § 76-6-404. . _ _--
2.. the. 340,000 received from Tanner was disbursed by* the" 
partnership as follows: 333,000 was paid as a down payment on 
the partnership's contract to purchase the 18-acre parcel; 
34,000 was paid to the real estate company handling the trans-
action; and the remaining 33,000 was split equally between 
on the Tanner contract. During the initial meeting between 
defendant and the partnership, one of the matters discussed 
relative to the impending collection was that of attorney 
fees. Defendant indicated that his fee for the requested 
services would be between $9,000 and S12,000, depending upon the 
extent of the work involved. The partnership, however, coun-
tered with an offer of a flat fee of $20,000 to cover the 
collection as well as defendant's representation of the partner-
ship in any connected litigation. The record does not reveal 
which fee proposal was ultimately agreed upon. 
Defendant was successful in negotiating a settlement 
between the partnership and Tanner, whereby Tanner agreed to 
sell his interest in both parcels if the partnership could find 
another buyer before Tanner could obtain financing. This 
settlement agreement was reduced to writing and signed by the 
parties (i.e., Mascaro, Joseph and Tanner) on February 8, 1979. 
Soon thereafter, defendant was commissioned by the partnership 
to effectuate the resale of the property. According to the 
testimony of Charley Joseph, defendant was to be paid an addi-
tional $20,000 if he was successful in finding a new buyer and 
completing the resale transaction. That testimony was however 
contradicted by defendant, who testified that he had agreed to 
perform the said services in exchange for one-third of the total 
income derived from the transaction. The record does not con-
tain any written documentation evidencing the parties1 inten-
tions with respect to attorney fees. 
Less than a month and a half after the signing of the 
settlement agreement, defendant succeeded in negotiating a new 
sale of the subject property (both parcels) to Chatillion, Inc. 
(hereinafter "Chatillion") at a total price of $1,280,000. 
Since the said property consisted of two distinct parcels owned 
by different individuals (i.e., a 130-acre parcel owned by Stan 
Logan and an 18-acre parcel owned by the partnership), the sale 
was accomplished by executing a separate earnest money agree-
ment between Chatillion and each of the owners. The agreement 
relevant to these proceedings is that between Chatillion and 
the partnership concerning the 18-acre parcel. That agreement 
provided that Chatillion would pay the partnership approximately 
$1.41,000 in cash and transfer to it property valued at $240,000. 
A closing was held on June 5, 1979, at which time 
Curtis Baum, Chatillion's principal officer and stockholder, 
tendered to the partnership a check for $100,000, as well as 
the deeds to eight building lots. The check was made payable 
to defendant in his capacity as attorney for the partnership 
and was deposited by defendant in his trust account, ~a~s _p.er the 
directions of Charley Joseph. The building lots were rejected 
:b-y the partnership because they were of insufficient "value". As. 
Tl The cash balance of S41,000 was to be paid within the 
following _w_eek. As will be shown infra, said payment was made 
in full, though perhaps not within the week after the closing. 
a result, Baum tendered deeds to another eight lots, but faile^ 
to deliver therewith an appraisal to substantiate their value. 
At trial Joseph testified that at the time the initial 
funds were received from Chatillion and deposited, he gave de-
fendant specific instructions regarding the disbursement there-
of. Those instructions were as follows: (1) Joseph was to 
receive, and did receive on that particular occasion, a check 
for 320,000 to cover his expenses; (2) $30,000 to 340,000 was 
to be applied toward the partnership's purchase of the 18-acre 
parcel from Shelby Taylor (original owner of the said parcel); 
(3) $25,000 to $30,000 was to b-e disbursed to Joseph Mascaro as 
his partnership share; and (4) an unspecified amount was to be 
reserved to cover closing expenses. 
Also testifying in regard to the disbursement instruc-
tions was Curtis Baum, who claimed to have been present at the 
time the $100,000 was deposited by defendant and to have been 
privy to the conversations between defendant and Joseph con-
cerning the appropriation of that money. His recollection of 
the instructions given defendant was identical to that given by 
Joseph (in his trial testimony), with only one exception: he 
thought he recalled the amount set aside for Mascaro as being 
$20,000 to $25,000, rather than $25,000 to $30,000. 
Another witness who claimed to have been privy to the 
subject conversation between defendant and Joseph was George 
Robinson, an employee of the defendant's on the occasion so 
specified. Robinson's testimony in this respect was consistent 
with Joseph's in nearly every respect, the only variation being 
that he did not recall a specific dollar amount committed to 
Shelby Taylor; rather, he thought the instruction with respect 
to the Taylor obligation was that an unspecified amount (of the 
deposited funds) should be used to make a down payment on an 
apartment complex that would then be conveyed to Taylor in 
satisfaction of the partnership's obligation to him. 
Defendant's version of the instructions given him as 
to the disbursement of the $100,000 was at variance with that 
adduced by the plaintiff through the testimonies of Joseph, 
Baum and _Robinson, supra. He testified that Joseph's instruc-
tions were to apply the funds toward the retainer (i.e., al-
legedly a one-third contingency fee) and use them- as needed at 
his (defendant's) own discretion. 
Bank records produced at trial revealed that on June 5, 
1979, prior to the recording of the $100,000 deposit,, defen-
dant's trust account registered an overdraft "of *$14\23. On 
June 18, 1979, less than two weeks after the'said deposit was 
made, defendant's trust account registered an overdraft of" 
$435.67. During that two-week period, only $25,903.64 from 
defendant's trust account was expended in connection with his 
TI Appraisals were to be delivered within a few days. The 
record does not show whether said delivery took place. 
work for the partnership; the balance was spent on defendant's 
personal expenses. 
Over the period between June 25, 1979, and September 
1979, defendant received and deposited in his trust account on 
behalf of the partnership additional payments from Chatillion 
totalling 341,037.09. Of this amount only 321,854 was expended 
in connection with business of the partnership. Thus, of the 
total $141,037.09 received from Chatillion and deposited into 
defendant's trust account, only $47,757.64 was spent in fur-
therance of-partnership business, leaving a difference of 
393,279.45. 
Despite Chatillion1s satisfaction of the cash obli-
gation on the 13-acre purchase, the sale of that parcel was 
never fully consummated because an agreement was never reached 
in respect to the value of the lots tendered by Chatillion. 
5. The 325,903.64 figure was calculated on the basis of tne 
following stipulated expenditures: (1) a 320,000 payment to 
Charley Joseph; (2) a $903.64 payment to Bitner Excavating in 
satisfaction of a debt owed by Joseph; and (3). a 35,000 payment 
to defendant's employee, George Robinson, for-work done for the 
partnership. 
6. The parties further stipulated that defendant's personal 
expenditures from the 31.00,000 included, inter alia, the 
following: (1) payment of $1,753.27 to Jones Paint & Glass for 
installation of a window at defendant's residence; (2) payment 
of $26,644.23 to Thorn, Inc., for accounts previously collected 
on behalf of Thorn, Inc.; (3) payment of $6,920 to L. Flake 
Rogers for back rent on defendant's office; (4) payment of 
34,183.20 to Deseret Federal Savings for payments in arrears on 
defendant's home; (5) payment of 33,119.70 to M. Dayle Jeffs, 
an attorney, in settlement of a 1977 default judgment against 
defendant for unpaid credit card debts; (6) payment ol_S9,125 
to F.M.A. Leasing for the lease of a 1974 vehicle and a 
Burroughs computer; (7) payment of $4,713.75 to Burroughs 
Corporation for updating the memory of defendant's computer; 
(8) paym.ent of 36,530 to Provo 27th Ward as a charitable con-
tribution; (9) payment of 31,432.46 to Meredith & Day on a 
student loan debt; (10) payment of 32,392.72 to Service Station 
Supply,- Ine-* , for accounts collected on its behalf; and (11) 
payment of 31,325.81 to Utah Office Supply for accounts 
collected on its behalf. 
7. It was stipulated that the $21,854 was spent as follows: 
(1) 318,000 was paid to Charley Joseph; (2) 32,500 was paid to 
George Robinson for work he performed for the part-nership, 
(3) 31,000 was paid to Mountainland Realty; (-4) $350-was paid 
to Aspen Engineering; and (5) $4 was paid to the Salt Lake 
County Recorder. 
8. 'The State acknowledged defendant's possible entitlement to 
a S20,000 fee pursuant to the flat fee arrangement described at 
trial by Joseph and, therefore, charged defendant with the 
theft of only $73,279.45 rather than the full 393,279.45. 
Also contributing to the failure to bring the sale to comple-
tion was the dispute that arose between the partners, Mascaro 
and Joseph, in November, 1979. The apparent cause of that dis-
pute was that Mascaro had never received his share of the money 
paid by Chatillion. As a result, Mascaro, along with Shelby 
Taylor, who likewise had never received a payment out of the 
said funds, obtained other counsel and in May of 1980 brought 
suit to recover the sums allegedly owed them, naming as de-
fendants Charley Joseph, Chatillion, Inc. (Baum), and the defen-
dant herein, John Davis. Defendant represented himself and 
Joseph in that action. However, he did not file an answer to 
the complaint, and consequently a default judgment was entered 
against them. He then succeeded in getting the judgment set 
aside and .was ordered to respond to the complaint within thirty 
days. Again, he failed to respond, and a second default judg-
ment was entered. The trial court subsequently ordered defen-
dant to withdraw as counsel because he was to be called as a 
witness by the plaintiffs (Mascaro and Brown). 
On June 18, 1981, after the second default judgment 
had been entered against Davis (defendant) and Charley Joseph, 
Joseph Rust, attorney for plaintiffs Taylor and Mascaro, deposed 
defendant in connection with the continuing litigation between 
Rust's clients, and Chatillion. At that deposition, defendant 
represented that he was still holding the monies received from 
Chatillion in his trust account; but refused to reveal "the 
location of the trust account. After the deposition, Charley 
Joseph, who had been present and had heard defendant make the 
foregoing representation, inquired of defendant as to where he 
was holding the money. Defendant purportedly replied that he 
had the money but did not have to tell anyone where it was. 
Joseph subsequently filed a cross-claim against 
defendant and, at the suggestion of-counsel, also filed criminal 
charges against him for theft. Defendant declined to answer the 
cross-claim because, as he later explained at trial, he did not 
want to prejudice his case in the present criminal matter. Con-
sequently, Joseph obtained a default judgment against defendant 
in the amount of $180,000. 
Attorney Rust petitioned the trial court for an order 
to require defendant to disclose information concerning his 
trust account. Several hearings were held on this matter, and 
finally an order was issued that defendant make full disclosure. 
As a result, defendant's bank records were obtained and it was 
discovered, contrary to what defendant had represented, that 
the funds received from Chatillion had been fully exhausted-. 
As heretofore indicated, the records also revealed that the 
funds had been spent primarily in satisfaction of defendant's 
personal expenses. 
W. That defendant made this representation was verified at 
trial by Joseph Rust, Charley Joseph and Brad Young (the court 
reporter who transcribed the deposition), all of whom were 
The instant matter proceeded to trial on October 18, 
1982. Defendant had made a motion before trial to waive his 
right to a jury trial, but his motion had been denied on the 
basis of a prosecution objection. The case was therefore tried 
before a jury, and defendant was found guilty of theft.1 
I. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE 
Defendant contends that the evidence presented at 
trial was insufficient to support his conviction of theft. 
Under familiar rules of appellate review, we are constrained to 
view the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury's 
verdict and will only interfere with or overturn the verdict 
when the evidence is so lacking and insubstantial that a reason-
able man could not-possibly have reached a verdict beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
To sustain a conviction of theft, the evidence must 
establish the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt: 
(1) that the defendant obtained or exercised unlawful control 
over the-property of another (2) with a purpose to deprive him 
thereof. 
The underlyingipremise to defendant's claim of insuf-
ficient of tSe evidence is.the belief that his testimony pro-
vided t.. : only reasonable and truthful account of the events 
and circumstances precipitating this action and therefore all 
conflicting evidence should have been disbelieved and dis-
regarded by the jury. Overlooked in this premise is the funda-
mental rule that the prerogative to judge the credibility of 
witnesses and evidence in general belongs to the jury. In 
State v. Shonka, where the appellant made a claim similar to 
that made herein by defendant, this Court observed: 
10. Defendant was sentenced to not more than five years in 
the Utah State Prison and fined S5,000. Both the sentence and 
fine were stayed, however, and defendant was placed on two 
years' probation on condition that he work one day a week for 
fifty weeks for the Utah County Sanity Administration and that , 
he make restitution to the victims in the amount determined by 
the civil lawsuit on the same matter. Defendant's conviction, 
although originally a second degree felony, was reduced at 
sentencing to a third degree felony. 
11. See State v. Jones, Utah, 657 P.2d 1263 (1982); State v. 
Forsyth, Utah, 641 P.2d 1172 (1982); State v. Asay, Utah, 631 
P.2d 861 (1981). 
12. U.C.A., 1953, § 76-6-404. It is noted that in order for 
a
 tkeft conviction to be punishable as a secund i-egree felony— 
Tas this one was), the requirements of § 76-6-412 must-also be 
satisfied. The latter section was satisfied in "this case by 
the parties1 stipulation that the value of the property alleged 
to have been stolen exceeded $1,000. 
13. 3 Utah 2d 124, 279 P.2d 711 (1955). 
What the defense argument overlooks is that 
the jury was not absolutely bound to be-
lieve all of the testimony of the defendant. 
It was their prerogative to give it only 
such weight as they thought it entitled to 
considered in the light of all of the facts 
and circumstances surrounding the occur-
rence, including the self-interest of the 
witness. 
To establish the first element of the offense, plain-
tiff had to show (1) that the money received from Chatillion 
actually belonged to the partnership, and (2) that defendant 
obtained or exercised unlawful control over that money. 
As proof that the money belonged to the partnership, 
plaintiff offered the following evidence: Curtis 3aumfs testi-
mony indicating his intention to pay the partnership with the 
money tendered to defendant and his perception of defendant's 
role with respect to the money as that of a mere conduit or 
intermediary; the check for $100,000 evidencing defendant's 
representative capacity by the fact that it was made payable to 
defendant not in a personal capacity, but rather as attorney 
for the partnership; and the testimony of both Joseph and the 
defendant to the effect that the"money was deposited in 
defendant's account at Joseph's direction. 
To prove the second half of this element (i.e., the 
exercise of unlawful control), plaintiff established first, 
through the testimony of Charley Joseph, Curtis Baum and George 
Robinson, that defendant received explicit instructions from 
Joseph to disburse the money received from Chatillion in the 
payment of partnership expenses. Plaintiff then showed that of 
the 5141,037.09 ultimately received from Chatillion, only 
547,754.64 was disbursed as directed.(i.e., on behalf of part-
nership expenses), while $93,279.45 was disbursed to satisfy 
defendant's personal obligations. Furthermore, plaintiff 
pointed out that while $20,000 of the $93,279,45 consumed by 
defendant was actually owed defendant by the partnership in 
attorney fees, defendant had only received authorization to 
take $6,000 toward his fee from the total received from 
Chatillion. As to the additional $20,000 offered defendant for 
arranging and transacting a new sale after the Tanner default, 
plaintiff pointed out that the sale had never been fully con-
summated and therefore the fee was not owing. 
The only evidence offered by defendant to controvert 
plaintiff's proof on this first element of the offense was his 
own~~l:e¥timo~ny relative to the agreement for attorney fees 
and the instructions for the disbursement of the money received 
from Chatillion. As heretofore indicated, defendant testified 
that he was to receive a one-third contingency fee for his 
services subsequent to the Tanner default. Inasmuch as the 
sale to Chatillion was worth approximately S381,000 to the 
partnership, defendant claimed that his portion was in excess 
of 3100,000. He further claimed that the partners had agreed 
to take as their portion the real property traded by Chatillion 
(valued at 3240,000). Thus, he maintained that the 3100,000 
received from Chatillion actually belonged to him. 
Even had the jury accepted defendant's representation 
as to the fee arrangement, they would not have been justified 
in concluding that his appropriation of the money received from 
Chatillion as his fee was proper because, as plaintiff pointed 
out, defendant never consummated the services for which he was 
to receive the alleged contingency fee. 
Defendant further testified that the instructions he 
received from Joseph relative to the disbursement of the money 
were that it should be applied toward defendant's retainer and 
used at his own discretion. Based on those instructions, he 
claimed that his expenditures were justified and did not con-
stitute an exercise of unauthorized control. 
Viewing the foregoing evidence in a light most favor-
able to the jury's verdict, we believe reasonable minds could 
believe beyond a reasonable doubt that the cash* paid by 
Chatillion belonged to the partnership and that defendant's 
disbursement of that cash to himself for his own purposes con-
stituted unauthorized control. 
As to the second element of the offense, to wit: 
intent to deprive, it is well-settled that such need not be 
proved by direct evidence, but may be inferred from the defen-
dant's acts, conduct, statements or from the circumstances. 
According to plaintiff, the most salient evidence in this regard 
is as follows: Defendant twice failed to enter responsive 
pleadings in the civil action brought against himself, Joseph 
and Chatillion by Taylor and Mascaro, apparently to avoid being 
compelled to give an accounting of the money deposited in his 
trust account. Furthermore, he subsequently represented under 
oath at the June 18, 1981 deposition that he was still holding, 
the money in his trust account, although bank records estab-
lished that he had in fact expended the money nearly a full 
year earlier. Plaintiff contends that this evidence, combined 
with that set forth above relative to defendant's appropriation 
of the money, establishes beyond a reasonable doubt defendant's 
"intent to deprive." 
Again, defendant urges that his testimony at trial 
that he honestly believed he was entitled to the money as*his 
fee was sufficient to legate plaintiff's evidence (above) 
respecting the element of intent. The jury, however, whose 
l5"1 State v. Murphy, Utah, 674 P.2d 1220 (1983); State v. 
Kennedy, Utah, 616 P.2d 594 (1980). 
prerogative it is r veigh such evidence, did ot countenance 
defendant's position, and neither do we. 
This is not the first time this Court has found 
"intent to deprive'1 under circumstances such as are existing 
here. In State v. Shonka, supra, this Court ruled that the 
evidence that defendant admitted taking the money, failed to 
record it or report it to her supervisors, failed to disburse 
it in the proper manner, and refused to permit an audit of her 
personal accounts was sufficient to support the jury's finding 
of intent to steal. By comparison, in the instant matter, 
defendant admittedly appropriated most of the money for his own 
use, failed to report such appropriation to the partnership, 
failed to follow the disbursement instructions given him by 
Joseph and avoided revealing the location of his trust account 
and the nature of the expenditures. We hold, as did the Court 
in Shonka, that the evidence so stated constitutes a sufficient 
factual foundation from which reasonable minds could infer that 
defendant took the money with the intent to deprive the 
partnership thereof. 
II. RIGHT TO WAIVE A JURY TRIAL 
Defendant's second assignment of error is in respect 
to the trial court's denial of his motion to waive a jury 
trial. He claims that the court's ruling in this_ regard abro-
gated his constitutional right to an impartial trial. We do 
not agree. 
We addressed theginstant issue most recently in the 
case of State v. Studham. We determined therein that the 
trial court had not erred in denying the defendant's motion to 
waive his jury right. The rationale applied in reaching that 
determination is dispositive here: 
Although an accused is guaranteed a right 
of trial by jury, neither the state nor the 
federal constitution guarantees him a right 
to "waive" a jury trial. On the contrary, 
Federal Rule 23(a), Criminal Procedure, and 
its-counterpart, U.C.A., 1953, § 77-35-
17, both allow such waiver only by the 
Il?n Supra note 13, at 714. 
17. Pursuant to the guarantees set forth in Article I, 
Section 12 of the Utah Constitution, to wit: 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall 
have the right . . . to have a speedy 
public trial by an impartial jury of the 
county or district in which the offense is 
alleged to have been committed . . . . 
18. Utah, 655 P.2d 669 (1982). 
19. This section provides, in pertinent part: 
(c) All felony cases shall be tried by 
jury unless the defendant waives a jury in 
open court with the approval of the court 
and the consent of the orosecution. 
court's a^ roval and the consent or .ie 
prosecution* 
In the instant case, neither the court nor the prose-
cution consented to the proposed waiver. Furthermore, the 
record is devoid of any indication that defendant was denied a 
fair trial as a result of the case being tried to a jury. We 
therefore hold that the trial court's denial of the requested 
waiver did not interfere with defendant's constitutional rights. 
III. REBUTTAL EVIDENCE 
Defendant next assigns error in the admission of a 
written excerpt of his June 18, 1981 deposition as rebuttal 
evidence. The circumstances out of which this alleged error 
arose are set forth hereafter. 
During the presentation of its case-in-chief, plain-
tiff called upon Charley Joseph to testify concerning a response 
given by defendant at his June 13, 1981 deposition (to which 
Joseph had been privy) to the question as to whether defendant 
still had the money received from Chatillion in his trust 
account and, if so, where that account was located. Defendant's 
response to that question, as Joseph recalls it, was that the 
money was still in the account, but that he did not have to 
reveal the location of the account or anything further con-
cerning it. 
At that point in the trial proceedings, plaintiff 
moved to have the corresponding portion of the written deposi-
tion admitted into evidence as an exhibit. The trial court, 
however, expressed its view that such an admission would be 
duplicative in light of Joseph's testimony; ^hereupon, defendant 
made an objection to that effect which was sustained. 
During plaintiff's subsequent cross-examination of 
defendant, defendant was asked to verify his deposition state-
ment. His initial response was that he did sot recall being 
asked the question or having answered it as Joseph had repre-
sented. After being shown the deposition to refresh his memory, 
he then claimed that he had misunderstood the question at the 
time it was asked (i.e., June 18, 1981) and that his answer had. 
been clarified at a later deposition taken in September, 1981. x 
20.Supra note 18,at 671.See also State v.Black, Utah, 
551 P.2d 518, 520 (1976); Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24 
(1965) . 
21. The portion of the September 23, 1981 deposition that 
purportedly clarified the response in the earlier June deposi-
tion was read into the record as follows: 
Q. Am I to understand that you did not 
understand the question at that time? 
A. Well, apparently not. I have since 
answered as required by the Court. I 
answered regarding the trust account at 
that time and I indicated that the trust 
Considering defendant's statements on cross-examina-
tion with regard to the status of the trust account at the time 
the June deposition was taken inconsistent with his representa-
tions in that same regard in the deposition, plaintiff called 
Brad Young, the court reporter who took the June deposition, as 
a rebuttal witness. Young verified the accuracy of the deposi-
tion and added his independent recollection of defendant's 
statement. At that point, plaintiff again moved to have the 
written excerpt from the deposition containing defendant's 
statement admitted as an exhibit corroborating Young's rebuttal 
testimony* Defendant interposed an objection to its admission 
on grounds that it did not constitute a prior inconsistent 
statement. The court ruled that it was the equivalent of a 
prior inconsistent statement and could be admitted as "an ini-
tial question of fact for the jury to determine." Defendant 
made no further objection, and the evidence was admitted as 
Exhibit P-l. 
Defendant contends on appeal that evidence that goes 
to "an initial question of fact" can only be presented as part 
of the case-in-chief. He did not, however, base his objection 
to the admission of Exhibit P-l on those same grounds at trial. 
Rat.her, his objection there was limited to the exhibit's admis-
sion as a prior inconsistent statement, which basis he apparently 
abandons on appeal. Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Evidence 
provides: 
A verdict or finding shall not be set 
aside, nor shall the judgment or decision 
based thereon be reversed, by reason of the 
erroneous admission of evidence unless (a) 
there appears of record objection to the 
evidence timely interposed and so stated as 
to make clear the specific ground or objec-
tion • • • • 
(Emphasis added.) In light of this rule, we hold that defen-
dant's present assertion of error in respect to the admission 
of Exhibit P-l is precluded. 
IV. THE USE OF DEPOSITIONS IN JURY DELIBERATIONS 
Defendant's final assignment of error is in respect 
to the trial court's permitting the jury to take Exhibit P-l (a 
partial deposition) with them iirto their place of deliberation. 
He argues that in so doing, the court violated Rule 17 of the 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure (U.C.A., 1953, S 77-35-17(k)) 
which provides in pertinent part: 
(k) Upon retiring for deliberation, 
the jury may take with them the instruc-
tions of the court and all exhibits and 
papers which have been received as 
evidence, except depositions; and each 
juror nay also take with him any notes of 
the testimony or other proceedings taken 
by himself, but none taken by any other 
person. 
(Emphasis added.) 
Plaintifffs rejoinder to this argument is that there 
is nothing in the record that even suggests that Exhibit P-l 
went with the jury into deliberation and therefore the defen-
dant has failed in his burden of showing error. 
In the absence of any indication in the record to the 
contrary, we assume that all evidentiary exhibits were sent witn 
the jury into deliberation. Such an assumption is appropriate 
here. We therefore conclude that error was committed as 
assigned by defendant. 
Our conclusion in this regard comports with decisional 
law in this as well as other jurisdictions. In State v. 
Solomon, this Court held that it was error to permit a por-
tion of a witness's transcript to be taken to the jury room, 
reasoning as follows: 
It is evident therefore that under the 
statutes such written testimony is not to 
be read by the jury in the jury room but 
is to be read to them in open court, sub-
ject to all objections to be made, the 
same as if the witness were present and 
testifying. The written record thereof 
should not be taken to the jury room where 
the jury might read it. A written instru-
ment, made an exhibit in the cause but not 
consisting of testimony of a witness in 
the case, may of course be taken to the 
jury room the same as maps, diagrams, and 
other exhibits. But the testimony of a 
witness is in a different category. Such 
is the provision of the statutes and the 
common law always excluded depositions and 
written testimony from being carried from 
the bar by the jury. We can see no reason 
why the court should depart from the well 
established rule. It may often happen 
that the testimony on one side is oral 
from witnesses produced before the jury, 
while the testimony for the other side on 
TT. 96 Utah 500, 87 P.2d 807 (1939). See also State v~. 
Wilson, 188 Kan. 67, 360 P.2d 1092 (1961); State v. Payne, 199 
Wis. 615, 227 N.W. 258 (1929); Shedden v. Stiles, 121 Ga, 637, 
49 S.E. 719 (1905) . 
essential matters is in the form of depo-
sitions or in the transcript from testi-
mony at a previous hearing. If the hearing 
lasts for any length of time and the jury 
takes the depositions or transcript to be 
read and discussed while the oral evidence 
contra has in a measure faded from the 
memory of the jurors, it is obvious that 
the side sustained by written evidence is 
given an undue advantage* The law doe-s 
not permit depositions or witnesses to go 
to the jury room. 
While we are convinced of the commission of the 
asserted error, we are unable to find in the record any objec-
tion thereto. In the absence of a proper and seasonably 
objection, an error such as this will be deemed waived. ~ We 
hold, therefore, that defendant's failure to so object pre-
cludes assertion of this error. 
Affirmed. 
WE CONCUR: 
I. Daniel Stewart, Justice 
Richard C. Howe, Justice 
Christine M. Durham, Justice 
Dean E. Conder, District Judge 
Oaks, Justice, having resigned, does not participate 
herein; Conder, District Judge, sat. 
~2T. 87 P.2d at 811. " ~ " ~ ~ 
24. S£e State v. Hofer, 238 Iowa 820, 28 N.W.2d 475, 481 
(1947); Proctor v. State, 235 Ga. 720, 221 S.E.2d 556, 558-59 
(1975); Shedden v. Stiles, supra note 22; People v. Dixon, 
37 111. 2d 416, 226 N.E.2d 608, 610 (1967); State v. Solomon, 
supra note 22. 
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kind of action is, that the defendant, 
upon the circumstances of the case, is 
obliged by the ties of natural justice 
and equity to refund the money/ 
The Maryland court continued: 
It is stated in Poe on Pleading, 
Tiffany Edition, Section 117, in refe-
rence to the count for money had and 
received: "This count is commonly 
said to be equally remedial with a bill 
in equity, and, in general terms, lies 
whenever the defendant has obtained 
possession of money which, in equity, 
and good conscience, he ought not to 
be allowed to retain." Mr. Poe relied 
on Moses v. Macferlan, • supra. See 
also Murphey v. Barron, 1 Har. & G. 
258. While there was only a special 
count in the declaration here, the 
facts are set out with sufficient parti-
cularity to be treated as a count for 
money had and received. 
The court analogized its holding to cases 
which it cited where a state or one of its 
subdivisions had recovered overpayments, 
quite independently of any statutory autho-
rity. Reliance was also placed on section 46 
of the Restatement of Restitution. 
In conclusion, the unfortunate and regrett-
able conclusion reached by the majority need 
not be reached. The purpose of unemploy-
ment compensation laws is to provide for 
workers who become unemployed through no 
fault of their own. Unemployment compens-
ation funds are supported by contributions 
from employers and taxpayers. It has a 
worthy purpose, but that purpose is thwarted 
when a worker can refuse to abide by a rule 
of the administering department, refuse to 
sign a wage assignment after he has drawn 
compensation during his weeks of need while 
his. grievance was being processed, and the 
Department has to sit idly by because it can 
do nothing to redress the injustice of double 
recovery. The purpose of the statutes is to 
compensate the employee for unemployment, 
not to unjustly enrich him. 
I would sustain the order of the Depart-
ment, the administrative law judge, and the 
Board of Review ordering the plaintiff to 
make restitution. 
Cite as 
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PER CURIAM: 
This is an appeal from various post-
conviction orders of the district court, inclu-
ding the denial of a motion for a new trial. 
In 1982, defendant was found guilty of 
theft, a third degree felony, in violation of 
U.C.A., 1953, §76-6-404. He appealed and 
argued, inter alia, that the trial court errone-
ously permitted part of a written deposition 
to be taken into the jury room. In State v. 
Davis, 689 P.2d 5 (Utah 1984), this Court 
affirmed the conviction .and ruled that defen-
dant was precluded from asserting the error 
on appeal in view of his failure to make a 
seasonable objection at trial. 
After defendant's petition for rehearing 
was denied by this Court and the case was 
remitted to the district court, defendant filed 
an amended motion for a new trial based on 
the jury's access to the written deposition. 
The trial court denied this motion on the 
ground that it was not timely. Defendant 
appeals this ruling, alleging that he has now 
made a proper challenge to the error in dist-
rict court. For the same reason that the issue 
was deemed waived on direct appeal (i.e., 
failure to make a proper and seasonable 
objection), the trial court properly denied 
defendant's motion for a new trial. 
Defendant also requests that the sentencing 
orders be declared invalid and that the case 
be remanded for resentencing. However 
questionable the procedures employed in 
entering the formal order of sentence, the 
matter is now moot since defendant has 
served his sentence and has received a formal 
termination of probation. As stated in Spain 
v. Stewart, 639 P.2d 166, 168 (Utah 1981), 
'Where the requested judicial relief can no 
longer affect the rights of the litigants, the 
case is moot and a court will normally refrain 
from adjudicating it on the merits." The 
exception alluded to is where there is a conti-
nuing and recurring controversy but, because 
of the short time period for adjudication, 
appellate review of the issue is effectively 
For UTAH CODE ANNOTATIONS, see the second section of this issue. 
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denied. Wickham v. Fisher, 629 P.2d 896 I 
(Utah 1981). That is not the situation in the 
instant case. Since all questions raised as to 
sentencing orders are now moot, we will not 
address the merits of defendant's arguments. 
As a separate point on appeal, defendant 
contends that the court's order of restitution 
was invalid due to irregularities before and 
during the restitution hearing. The record 
contains no formal order of restitution. The 
only record of that proceeding is an unsigned 
minute entry which is not appealable. South 
Salt Lake v. Burton, 33 Utah Adv. Rep. 27 
(1986). 
The issues raised in defendant's amended 
motion for a new trial were addressed in the 
direct appeal, and we affirm the trial court's 
denial of that motion. We decline to address 
any of the remaining issues (as to sentencing 
and restitution), since those issues are not 
properly before the Court. 
So ordered. 
For cumulative UTAH CODE ANNOTATIONS, see the second section of this issue. 
ADDENDUM B 
EXHIBIT B 
Dear Mr. Hutchinson, 
In 1979 I became involved in a business matter with John Davis's father-in-law and 
I also got acquainted with Mr. Davis. He being from Provo, I told him I was on a 
property matter with Paul Tanner also of Provo who is a home builder. When I mentioned 
his name Mr. Davis was very anxious to know all about our transaction and said he knew 
Mr. Tanner very well and was trying to collect money for an account he had in Provo by 
the name of Thorns Const. Ready Mix 
Mr. Davis and myself went to see Mr. Tanner and he seemed surprised and wanted to 
know how I had got to know him. Mr. Tanner told me how good Mr. Davis was that he had 
been as was after him on several matters before. 
Mr. Mascario (my partner) on this property deal then met with Mr. Davis and he ex-
plained to us his dealings he had previously with Mr. Tanner. We in turn hired him and 
Mr. Davis started to work on our transaction. Being very complex it took quite a long 
time to get things going on this deal and after a period of time Masscario got provoked 
at me and Mr. Davis and didn't show up for some of the meetings we would have and those 
he did attend h e always had to leave early before the meetings were over. So I told 
Mr. Davis to continue that I had full trust in him. 
Wcrlcinj with ^r. Davis and Mr Baus'thc: buyer of .:^.:d pr^r~rtis?0 fcr a year cr ir.or-.:, 
the transaction was with in a few days of being closed. Mr. Masscario got mad at 
Mr. Davis and myself and the next thing we knew he had other council to represent him. 
Mr. Bert wyncott now Mr. Masscario's attorney asked Mr. Davis for a complete break 
down of the transaction etc. which Mr. Davis personally done the closing of papers and 
distributing of the monies. During this time Mr. Masscario asked me if the down-pay-
ment was made, I told him there had been to hang on for a few days. Within a short 
period I was served with a summons from Mr. Wynoccott and Mr. Masscario. I called Mr. 
Davis and he claimed he had been served also. Mr. Davis then came to my home. I told 
him to be sure and answer the summons for me and he said "don't worry about it, I'll 
take care of it because he had to fill his out also. I called him several times after 
that and asked him if he had filled out the necessary papers for an answer to the 
summons and he assured me he would take care of it. Mr. Davis never took care of 
the summons I had received and he never intended to. Al.-short while later, I received 
a call from my wife, she was crying. We had been served with papers for a siszure on 
my home and other properties of mine which I have worked for all my life to accumlate. 
I immediately called Mr. Davis and he assured me he would get it straightened out* 
The next day we were informed that our checking account had a garinshement OIL it which 
caused considerable problems plus embarrasment. Things were worked out (temporally). 
Three months go by Ifm calling Davis (long distance) constantly to get this transactio: 
cleared up so we can all go about our business. Again we are served with another siezure 
on my home, properties etc* I called Davis and he clamek that the Judges are changed 
around and assured me once again not to worry that he knew what he was doing to please 
trust him and to assure my wife that he would take care of everything. 
As the weeks and months wore on with Mr. Davis doing nothing I was served with a 
notice to appear at Attorney Rust's office for a deposition. At the deposition I 
answered all the questions the best to my knowledge. I informed them that I did 
not have any papers or documents that Mr. Davis kept everything. 
On Mr. Davis's deposition the same day they asked him what the amount of the sale 
was and he answered, then they asked him where the other $130,000.00 to $140,000.00 
was he claimed he had. Mr. Davis refused to tell Mr. Rust where the money was. They 
asked him U or 5 times more and he still refused to tell them anything. 
As we left the attorney's office, I asked Mr. Davis why in the hell didn't he tell 
them where the money was. I inturn asked him if indeed he did have the money. His 
answer to me was "I.'rn not going to tell you or anyone else where it is. 
A few days later there was for the 3rd time a siezure handed my wife on my home, 
and property. Again I call him to ask him please get this straightened out and re-
minded him again that if he had just taken the interest and time to answer the summons 
in the first place we wouldn't be going through all this. Again he said "trust me" 
"dont worry I111 get it all straightened out" which he had no intention of doing* 
Again we go to court and the Judge denies the judgement to be dismissed* A 
few days later I was informed by mail that the best thing for me was to get other 
council, as Mr* Davis would also have to get council for himself* 
A few days later I received papers again from Mr* Rusts office for another dep-
osition to be taken* At that point I hired Attorney Dale Potter to represent me* 
On the day of the deposition Mr* Potter and I was informed that Mr* Davis had closed 
his trust account many months before and that they were going to ask the bank where 
Mr* Davis has his account to bring all photostat copys of Mr* Davis checks to the 
hearing* Mr* Davis arrived shortly after the bank employee had delivered the photo 
stat copies to Mr* Rust and not knowing the bank had already been there he informed 
Mr* Rust that he was going to serve him with a restraining order on his trust and 
bank account. He was a little late* With a few moments ij^again asked Mr* Davis where 
the money was and again he answered nI donft have to tell you and Itm not going to. 
We again started my deposition and again I answered all questions to the best of 
my knowledge* We started to go over all of Mr* Davis checks that he had written* 
You canft imagine what I felt when I seen those checks written by Mr* Davis to people 
I didn't know or never heard about in my life. It was so hard for me to believe 
that he had done this indecent thing to me jr even himself. At this point Mr. Davis 
raised his voicr to Mr. Rust and sy attorney got up and told !ir. Davis that ve was 
still taking Mr* Joseph's deposition and we see fraud and embezzlement here as we go • 
over each and every check* There was approximately only U checks that I recognized 
that had been written* Over a $100,000*00 Mr* Davis wrote for his own personal use. 
All this time he had me believe that this money was in his trust account* 
Right from the start when Chatillon (Mr. Baumfs Co) gave us the money, I told Davis 
to be sure and distribute some money to Masscario and Shelby Taylor* I myself received 
$38,000.00 in two seperate checks at different times. This money is what Davis 
said he had in his trust account* I never authorized Mr* Davis to use any or pay 
any of his own personal bills with the money he received* That money belonged to 
Mr. Masscario, Mr* Shelby and myself. 
Sir, this man has caused undo anguish to my wife and myself, he has hurt me in my 
business, and has added extra expense for me to hire Mr. Potter. I ask the bar to take 
the law to it!s full extent and have this man barred from practicing law anywhere in 
or out of the state of Utah. He is a disgrace to his fellowmen, his community, and 
his state. 
I have worked hard all my life have bee n fair and honest with people* ItTs still 
hard to believe that a man such as John Davis would jepordize his family, his job, etc. 
for money that he spent that wasn*t his to spend. 
1
 'HI P.! I 
Utah§tateBar 
Office of Stephen P. Hutchinson, Bar Counsel 
425 EAST FIRST SOUTH / SALT LAKE CITY UTAH 84111 
TtfcplKtf* 1400-662-9054, 531-9077 
January 12, 1982 
John S. Davis 
Attorney at Law 
1068 Grand Circle 
Provo, Utah 84 601 
Dear John: 
The enclosed complaint agains t y ou has been filed 
with the Committee on Ethics and Discipline by 
Charley Joseph. The activities complained of ma i ; 
constitute violations of the Revised Rules of 
Conduct of the Utah State Bar, to wit: 
I Canon, lf DR1-102 A (3) 
Specification.: Engaging in illegal conduct 
involving moral turpitude by converting trust 
funds belonging 'to a client to your own use 
or benefit, 
janon 9# DR9-1Q2 B(3,4) 
Specification: Failing to properly account 
for client funds in your possession or to 
pay said funds to your client as requested 
by the client. 
You are requested to submit a written response to 
this complaint to this office within ten days. A 
copy of your response will be provided to the com-
plainant. We will then notify you of the date and 
time set for consideration by the Committee. 
you v i n receive a notice of this Committee meeting, 
and will be given an opportunity to appear and make 
a brief statement in support of, or in addition to, 
your written response. Similarly, the complainant 
will be permitted to appear and be heard. These 
appearances are not required unless the Committee 
separately communicates a specific request for you 
to appear. 
If you have any questions concerning this natter, 
please call me at the telephone number above 
shown. 
Sincerely, 






BEFORE THE BOARE OF COMMISSIONERS 
OF 'THE OT ft H STATE BA R 
IN RE COMPLAINT 
III111,!! I1 " 13/ 
X 
The a t t o r n e y charged w i t h u n p r o f e s s i o n a l conduc t in 
t In in i ni(|i I j in ill 1 mi 111II mi mi in Hi in i mi i ill in 11 in i I mi in »i I 1 11 ir in- \\ ill mi ii 
Counse l .o i i n t h e S t a t e uf U t a h , and a member of t h e U t a h 
S t a t e HMii r e s i d m q ill H I P t M ,' of P r o v n f o u n t y of U t a h , 
£ i l l in III Il  III II i l l in mi in III i i i l l l i i 11 c i i l i J i u . ' . i i i n i 11 mi i l l mi i l l mi 1 11 I l l i i mi i i i i J f 
t h e E x e c u t i v e D i r e c t o r of t hi-1 llt.ati S t a t e Bar I s HUB Grain 
Ci f c l i Ill'"i" '1 111 afi 
II 
This Complaint is IJIPMIJ with HUP Board of 
Commissioners of the Utah State Bar by the undersigned as 
t i iii i n in t I II "i I 
the Utah St a, t e B a i:., 
H I 
The unprofessional conduct charged i n this complaint 
l s alleged t o ux= a s follows: 
C0UN1I II! 
summer Respondent undertook 
2. That, thereafter in June, 1979, Respondent collected 
proceeds of the aforesaid transactions on behalf of 
Mascaro and Joseph in an amount in excess of 
$95,000, misappropriated the same and unlawfully 
converted the same to his own use and benefit. 
3* That, thereafter Mr. Joseph and Respondent were 
named defendants in a lawsuit initiated by Mr. 
Mascaro and one Shelby Taylor; whereupon Respondent 
assured Joseph that Respondent would fully undertake 
the defense of the lawsuit on their joint behalf 
and would file an answer therein for them as co-
defendants. 
4. That, notwithstanding, the said representation to 
Joseph, Respondent intentionally and deliberately 
defaulted in the lawsuit, allowing plaintiffs to 
obtain a default judgment against himself and 
Joseph in excess of $300,000. That the purpose of 
this intentional default was to avoid litigation on 
the merits, thus preventing or delaying discovery 
proceedings which would have revealed the aforesaid 
embezzlement, and to gain sufficient time with which 
to divert or conceal Respondent's assets. 
5. That the aforesaid embezzlement and conversion, and 
the subsequent manipulation of the judicial process 
in order to conceal the same constitute violations 
of Rule III, Section 2-5, Section 3; and Rule IV, 
Canon 1, DR1-102 A (3),(4),(5) and (6), and Canon 9, 
DR9-102 B (3) and (4) . 
i ^ charged pursuant f'o the Mules of Conduct and 
Discipline the Utah state Bar.^  
StepBetJ FT Hutchinson 
Prosecutor 
Utah State Bar 
425 East First South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Pamela Greenwood 
Chairman of Ethics and 
Discipline Committee 
Utah State Bar 
425 East First South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
ADDENDUM D 
RUL2 11! 
OATH Qf THE ATTORNEY 
Tbm oath of an attorney, to be taken upon Admission to the Bar and 
to be followed in practice by eacii member of the Utah State Bar,, is promul-
gated and prescribed as follows: 
I Do SOLSMKLT Swxia: 
I wSI support the Constitution of the United S'iotes and the Consti* 
ration of the State of Utah* and that I wuL discharge the duties of 
Attorney and Counselor at Law -uxih 'fideiiv/; 
I wuL mamtam the respect due to Courts oj justice ana judicial 
officers, 
I wtZZ not cvnnsei or ruasvtam any suit or proceeding which shall 
appear to me to be unjust nor any defense except mch as I believe to be 
honestly debatable under the law of the land; 
I wul employ for the purpose of mairttaimng the causes confided :o 
me such means only as are consistent with truth and honor, and wul 
never seek to mislead the Judge or jury by any artrficz or false .smt^ement 
of fact or law,. 
I tvi2 maintain the confidencz cmd preserve the secrets at rn-y ...<-:, 
and wt2 accept no compensation in connection with his business -ixcept 
from him or with his knowledge and approval; 
I will abstain from ail offensive personality, and advance no fact 
prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a &arty or witness* urdess required 
by the justice of the cause with which I am charged; 
I wiiZ never refect 'from any consideration pei zonal to nvself, the 
cause of the defenseless or oppressed^ or delay any /nan's cause for lucre 
or malice. So HELP ME GOD, 
Cond^cf- Pr*S(nbed by /?u/e) 
DR 1-101 Maintaining Integrity and Competence of the Legal Profession. 
(A) A lawyer is subject to discipline if he has made a matenally false state-
ment in, or ii he has deliberately failed to disclose a material fact 
requested in connection with, has application for admission to the bar. 
(B) A lawyer shall not further the application for admission to the bar of 
another person known by him to be unqualified in respect to character, 
education, or other relevant attribute 
DB 1-102 Misconduct 
(A) A lawyer shall not: 
(1)' Violate a Disciplinary Ruie. 
(2) Circumvent a Disciplinary Rule through actions of another. 
(3) Engage in illegal conduct involving moral turpitude, 
(4) Engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrep-
resentation. 
(5) Engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of 
justice. 
(6) Engage in any other conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness 
to practice law. 
DR 1-103 Disclosure of Information to Authorities. 
(A) A lawyer possessing unprivileged knowledge of a violation of DR 1-102 
shall report such knowledge to a tribunal or other authority empowered 
to investigate or act upon such violation. 
(B) A lawyer possessing unprivileged knowledge or evidence concerning 
another lawyer or a judge shall reveal fully such knowledge or evidence 
upon proper request of a tribunal or other authority empowered to 
investigate or act upon the conduct of lawyers or judges. 
ADDENDUM E 
- THJi buAKi) ur u^riM- iSIONERS 
OF THE UTAH STATE BAH 
IN RE i 
J O H N SFTKPl'Alil'D DAVTS 
AMENDED COMPLAINT 
F - 1 37 
The attorney charged with unprofessional conduct in 
this complaint is John Sheppard Davis,, who is an Attorney and 
C jn 1 i mi LI1 iiii-11 ' . H ' . J I . H ci I, 11! . Ji 11, j if! i J d m e m b e r uH; I I" \* U ilr. lilliii 
S t a t e Bar , r e s i d i n g in the C i t y of Provo , c'ounty of D'tahr 
S t a t e I HI I ill IIII ;,)Sia .v i i l r P-SSI ao , ,or ,r l i n "| I" n I" I \ eori i ills, f 
the' Executive Director of the 'Utah State 18.31", is 1068 • Srand 
Circle, Provof Utah* 
I hi is compla in t i s f i l e d wit-h t" HP Rnani of 
Commissioner.:) ot the LJ Lai J btaLii Bai by the under bigned as 
the r e g u l a r l y appo in t ed E l h i e s arid D i s c i p l i n e Committee of 
t I - l . 
I l l 
Complaint ^ a^^c • tr a o *. >j x -
£>/;^/T O 
COUNT I 
1. That during the summer of 1978, Respondent 
undertook to represent the partnership of Joseph Mascaro and 
Charley Joseph in certain real estate transactions regarding 
real property in Utah County. 
Z* That, thereafter in June, 1979, Respondent 
collected proceeds of the aforesaid transactions on behalf 
of Mascaro and Joseph in an amount in excess of $95,000. 
and misappropriated the same and unlawfully converted the 
same to his own use and benefit. 
3- That, thereafter, Mr. Joseph and Respondent 
were named defendants in a lawsuit initiated by Mr. Mascaro 
and one Shelby Taylor, whereupon, Respondent assured Joseph 
that Respondent would fully undertake the defense of the 
lawsuit on their joint behalf and would file an answer 
therein for them as codefendants. 
4. That, notwithstanding, the said representation 
to Joseph, Respondent intentionally and deliberately 
defaulted in the lawsuit, allowing plaintiffs to obtain a 
default judgment against himself and Joseph in excess of 
$300,000. That the purpose of this intentional default was 
to avoid litigation on the merits, thus preventing or 
delaying discovery proceedings which would have revealed 
the aforesaid embezzlement, and to gain sufficient time with 
which to divert or conceal Respondents assets. 
5. T'lhinii" l In,1 a foresaid embezzlement: ami conver-
sion, and the subsequent manipulation ot the judicial process 
in order to conceal the same constitute violations of Rule 
j | I '.iiect ii.i I -in Il ll-'ulf' I '" i ",i I  U R L - U K I /' I I „  I I I I 
( 6 ) / and Canon ' ) , IDR9-10? LI (J!) and i[ -1J . 
COUNT I I 
] Respondent was convicted by a jury on one 
count ot. the 
2. On November 26 # 1982, the -Judgment and 
Commitment was entered, adjudging Respondent gu**^ «w 
char g e d a i :i d: c :: in \ i ::;: t ES 
3, The cnnnt of theft of which Respondent was con-
rj -l-Pfi |^  i felony i ni the second deqr*3^ is defined h 
in h III I I h ii I! Il i I i i in i i in i Ml ih i i IM 'Juji iutatedl \ 1 •* j 
a s amended) . The t r i a l j u d g e r e d u c e d t h e o f f l ense f o r w h i c h 
R e s p o n d e n t ^u J u u u l t n l h i !i-»Iuii r in I In I hi i I t l p<) i i ' « . 
: A I I I in I in I i I l Id H s p m I  11 II I i i in i I 11 i HI £ 
S e c t i o n 4 i n d C a n o n 1, MM.-L02 A ( 4 ) # of t h e 
R e v i s e d R I J I I P S i f P r n f p s n i nu l l roiidiiiinr I™ 'if il'in- ill iiilii 'f i h i"n 
R u l e I I I ml i R u l e s o i in i m 11L i. ne oL Llie Ulul i S t a t e 3 a i , i i id 
p a r a g r a p h 3 2 r R u l e s f o r X u L u y i a t i o n a n d M a n a g e m e n t o f t h e 
l,"i d I , 
WHEREFORE, t h e u n d e r s i g n e d , <; )i:i I )e!l:i a 1 f • ::)£ t h e UTAH 
STATE BAR pcays tha t proceedings be taken here in aga ins t the 
attorney charged pursuant to the Rules of Discipline of the 
Utah State Bar and that the Utah State Bar be awarded its 
costs in bringing this action. 
DATED t h i s ? ^ day of AoAgCLi^ , 19 9A , 
Pairtela Greenwood 
Chairman 
Ethics and Discipline Committee 
'cTUeffryPaoliiitiV 
Prosecutor 
Utah State Bar 
425 East First South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing Formal Complaint was mailed certified mail 
return receipt requested to John Sheppard Davis Attorney at 
Law, 1068 Grand Circle, Provo, Utah 34601 this day of 
ADDENDUM F 
23. Conviction of crime. Judgment of disbarment. Duty of clerks 
of court. Except for good cause shown, upon conviction of an attorney 
of a crime involving moral turpitude by any court, the Supreme Ccur-
will enter a Judgment of Disbarment against the accused and will order 
that the name of the accused be stricken from the roll of attorneys of 
the court, and that he be precluded from practicing as such attorney in 
ail the courts of this state. The clerk of a Utah state court in which 
any such conviction is had must, within thirty days thereafter, 
transmit to the Supreme Court a certified copy of the record of 
conviction, which shall be conclusive evidence thereof. An attorney sc 
disbarred shall not be entitled to readmission until he satisfies the 




BEFORE THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS 
OF THE UTAH STATE BAR 
In Re: ) 
) ORDER 
JOHN S. DAVIS ) 
) No. F-137 
The Respondent filed a Motion to Sever and Dismiss the 
First Count of the Formal Complaint filed by the Bar and a 
Motion to Sever and Dismiss the Second Count of the Formal 
Complaint. Counsel to the Bar has responded to both motions 
and the Respondent has filed a further supplement to his 
response and a waiver of oral argument in the matter in order 
to enable the consideration of the merits of the motions 
without further need to schedule formal meetings of the 
panel. 
The Respondent has also filed a Motion for a Pretrial 
Conference. 
Upon receipt of the memoranda in support of and in 
opposition to the motions filed by the Respondent, members of 
the panel read and considered the claims of the Respondent in 
the various motions. After reviewing the files and records-
of the Bar, with respect to the initiation of the formal 
complaint herein and after full deliberation by the panel, 
it is hereby ordered: 
1. The motion of the Respondent for a pre-trial 
hearing is granted and the pre-trial hearing will be held as 
scheduled by the parties prior to the date of any evidentiary 
hearing in the matter. 
2. The hearing date of January 15 is hereby stricken 
in accordance with the further terms of this order. 
3. The panel finds that a hearing panel of the Ethics 
and Discipline Committee made a determination and directed 
the Chairman of the Committee to file a formal complaint 
as set forth more fully in the amended formal complaint, 
Count 1, now on file herein. The panel further finds that 
the evidence before the panel indicates no evidence of bias 
or prejudice against the Respondent. The motion of the 
Pespondent to sever and dismiss the first count of the formal 
committee complaint is denied. 
4. The motion of the Pespondent to sever and dismiss 
the second count of the complaint is taken under advisement 
for a period of thirty (30) days from the date hereof. 
During the thirty (30) day period, the Bar counsel may or may 
not refer the allegations of Count 2 to the Ethics and 
Discipline Committee for the proceedings required by the 
Rules of Discipline. If Bar counsel determines that the 
matter should not be pursued, Count 2 of the formal complaint 
will be dismissed under the terms of this order. If the 
office of Bar counsel proceeds to refer Count 2 to the Ethics 
and Discipline Committer, further proceedings herein will be 
deferred until a determination is made by the Ethics and 
Discipline Committee as to whether or not a formal complaint 
will be filed based on the facts and circumstances underlying 
Count 2 of the formal complaint• 
In the event the matter is referred to the Committee and 
the Ethics and Discipline Committee determines not to file a 
formal complaint, Count 2 of the formal complaint hereir 
shall be dismissed and the panel shall proceed promptly to 
hear the allegations of Count 1. If the Ethics and 
Discipline Committee determines to direct the filing of a 
formal complaint after the required proceedings before the 
Ethics and Discipline Committee, Bar counsel may recruest that 
the formal complaint issued may be consolidated herein for 
hearing. 
This matter will be reconsidered in 30 days without 
further hearing to determine whether proceedings have or have 
not been initiated before the Ethics and Discipline 
Committee• If proceedings have not been initiated, a hearing 
date will be set for a pre-hearing conference and a hearing 
on the facts and circumstances underlying Count 1 of the 
formal complaint on file. 




C. Jeffry Paoletti 
Bar Counsel 
Utah State Bar 
425 East 100 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
BEFORE THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS 
OF THE UTAH STATE BAR 
In Re: 
JOHN S. DAVIS 
STIPULATION 
F-190 
It. is hereby stipulated and agreed between 
C. Jeffry Paoletti, Bar Counsel, and John S. Davis, 
Respondent that the Complaint filed in the above 
styled matter may be dismissed, without prejudice. 
Respondent will be making a presentation before 
Screening Panel "D,f of the Ethics and Discipline Comm 
on Thursday, April 25, 1985 regarding the issuance 
of a Formal Complaint and, therefore, the present 
complaint may be dismissed without prejudice* 
DATED this ?'<& day of X^l- f , 1985. 
;r 
C. Jeffry Paoletti 
Bar Counsel 
Jpfin S. Davis 
"Respondent 
Pro Se 
C. Jeffry Paoletti 
Bar Counsel 
Utah State Bar 
425 East 100 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
BEFORE THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS 
OF THE UTAH STATE BAR 
In Re: 
JOHN S. DAVIS 
ORDER 
F-190 
Based on the stipulation of the parties in 
the above-styled matter, Respondent's Motion to 
Quash is granted and the Formal Committee Complaint 
on file is hereby dismissed, without prejudice. 
DATED this / *5~ day of fl 0/h / 1985, 





BEFORE THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS 
OF THE UTAH STATE BAR 
IN RE: 
JOHN S. DAVIS 
COMPLAINT 
F-198 
The attorney charged with unprofessional conduct 
in this complaint is John S. Davis, who is an Attorney 
and Counselor in the State of Utah, and a member 
of the Utah State Bar, presently temporarily suspended, 
residing in the City of Provo, County of Utah, 
State of Utah, and whose address according to the 
records of the Executive Director of the Utah State 
Bar is, 1068 No. Grand Circle, Provo, Utah 84604. 
II 
This complaint is filed with the Board of 
Commissioners of the Utah State Bar by the undersigned 
as the regularly appointed Ethics and Discipline 
Committee of the Utah State Bar. 
Ill 
The unprofessional conduct charged in this 
Complaint is alleged to be as follows: 
1. Respondent was convicted by a jury on one 
count of theft. Attached hereto is a copy of the 
Complaint 
John S. Davis 
F-190 
Page 2 
information and jury verdict and incorporated by 
reference and marked Exhibit A, 
2. On November 26, 1982, Respondent was sentenced 
based on the verdict. Attached hereto are copies of 
the minute entries reflecting the conviction and sentencing 
which are incorporated herein and marked Exhibit B. 
3, The count of theft of which Respondent was 
convicted is a felony in the second degree as defined 
by 76-6-404 and 76-6-412(1)(a)(i), Utah Code 
Annotated (1953 as amended). The trial judge reduced 
the offense for which Respondent was convicted to a 
third degree felony, 
4. Respondent appealed his conviction to the 
Utah Supreme Court, The Court, by its decision filed 
June 25, 1984, affirmed Respondent's conviction. 
Attached hereto is a copy of the decision of the Utah 
Supreme Court, incorporated herein and marked Exhibit C. 
5, The conduct of Respondent is in violation 
of Rule II, Section 4, and Canon 1, DR 1-102(A)(4) of 
the Revised Rules of Professional Conduct of the Utah 
State Bar; Rule II (a), Rules of Discipline of the Utah 
State Bar; and paragraph 32, Rules for Integration and 
Management of the Utah State Bar. 
WHEREFORE, the undersigned, on behalf of the 
UTAH STATE BAR prays that proceedings be taken herein 
against the attorney charged pursuant to the Rules 
of Discipline of the Utah State Bar and that the Utah 
State Bar be awarded its costs in bringing this action. 
Complaint 
John S. Davis 
F-190 
Page 3 
D 1TED th. i s :2i r_ dav of 1985, 
C-i 
C. Jef 
Pamela T. Green w o o d 
Chairman 




Utah State Bar 
425 East 100 South 
Salt Lake C i t y , U t a 1: 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing Formal Complaint was mailed certified 
mail return receipt requested t o J o hn S• Davis, 
Attorney at Law, 1068 No. Grand Circle, Provo, Utah 
84601, this ^Z^f day of 1 9 8 5 , 
"'
 f KX>U QJJJU Y UMT* L,<T~ 
ADDENDUM J 
*0V 2Q 886 
B E F 0 R E 0 F T H i „ C A t i L Cu COMMISSIONERS 
OF THE TTAH STATE BAR 
In Re; 
\J L/AIJ.1* O • i-^ n v x J 




and F-13 7 Consolidated 
7 I in- | | H 1 I I l | i " HUM I M i- H 1 I I I M ] ,11 Ml r l III I- H> 1 1 r f h n P r ' | 1 " P i r 
Commissioners comprised of Gerald H, Kinghorn, Pandon U, Wilson 
a ^
A
 F, Allan H u n t e r ronvened in Thursday, II i1 lr lqu'f, it Qi'T) 
c I I i I I I M J i . l I J. l l i j | H I I L H i I I I I M I 1 U (, L i h> 1 I IN I , i 1 1 J mi I i I L I I I I 
p a r t i e s a t t h e c o n f e r e n c e room a t t h i» I =JW o f f i c e of J o n e s , Waldo, 
Ho lh rnnk am4 iVicHnrn m|h , 1 ^ '< uM'i M n n 't r n- f 'ni i i H 1 -'00 , "cal t 
Lake C i L> , III ill 8 4 1 0 1 . 
The h e a r i n g was convened a t 9 :30 a in , and r e c e s s e d u n t i 1 t h e 
a p p e d i 11 M H II I I1" i 11 I "' i i • ::::> i : i 1 1 ::i I : i ] • ii! 0 : 0 0 a m M i: D<r; i,". J |r [ < ; J r' ^ i J 
at 9:59 a m Present: were Mr. John S. Davis,, (herein referred to 
as the Respondent) appear1ng pro se Kar i n Hobbs, ccunseJ fc i the 
U" t a h S t a t e B a i ,  J o s e p 1 n E • T e s c h c o u n s e 1 f ::) r C b a r 11 e J o s e p I: i w h o 
was present pursuant to a subpoena for the Respondent. 
C o 1 i n s e J f ::  i: t: 1 I < Ei liiiii! a i: r e • ::j i: i e s t: e • ::! a i: i :i ] ii i: i • j a 3 t • : ; / h e t h e i 11 l e 
he a r 1 n g wo u 1 d p r o c e e d p u r s u a n t t o 11 I e I r o c e d u r e s o f D1 s c 1 p 11 n e o f 
the Utah State Bar adopted Sept e mb e r 2 5 , 19 8 5 o r t h e p r o v i s i o n s 
o f R in :i I < Ei 1 2: • :  !!iiii: 1 1 i s I h 12 ; • = c • f D :i s c ii p Jl i i: I e • : f 1 ii l« • • U I a I: S 1 at: e B =t: I: i i : ' if 
were in effect prior t: D the adoption of the Procedures of Disci-
p l i n e o f t h e utah state Bar of September 25, 19-85. 
The Respondent insisted that the prior rules of discipline 
be used for the hearing and all subsequent proceedings. After 
hearing the arguments of counsel and reviewing the material 
documents, the Panel finds that no difference exists between the 
Rules and the Procedures adverse to the Respondent; if the 
Respondent calls the attention of the Panel to a matter where an 
adverse conflict may exist, the Panel will rule on the matter and 
the appropriate rules during the hearing. 
The Panel will apply the Procedures of Discipline of the 
Utah State Bar adopted September 25, 1985 to the hearing except 
as provided more specifically above. 
The Respondent moved for the exclusion of witnesses to be 
heard by the Panel from the hearing room. The exclusionary rule 
was invoked and each party was asked to state the name of all 
witnesses to be called. The Panel instructed the witnesses to 
stand and be sworn. The following persons were named by the 
parties as witnesses: Mr. Randall Hall, Mr. Jeff Paoletti and 
Mr. Charlie Joseph were sworn by the reporter and admonished not 
to discuss their testimony with each other or discuss the subject 
matter of the hearing. 
The Respondent objected to counsel for Mr. Joseph remaining 
during the hearing. Under the public hearing provisions under 
which the Hearing is conducted, Mr. Tesch was allowed to remain 
in the room but was admonished while the witnesses were leaving. 
11 i € • r o c m i i ::: t t • ::: :I i s c i i s s 1:1 I e o p e n :i :i: i g s t a t e me n t s a r g i i m e n t = : r 
t e s t imony o f wi t n e s s e s w i t h h i s c I i e n t o r o fc he r wi t n e s s e s • 
C o u n s e 1 f o r t h e B a r p r o c e e d e d t o in a k e a n open i n g s t a t e m e n t . 
A !::: 11 i€ « ::: 1 o s EE :: f 1 1 : i e • ::: •p e i: i i i i• ::j s t a I::  erne i I t t } • ::c* u n s e J. f<>i: t h tj B a :i : 11: i• EE 
Panel confirmed that the hearing was going forward only under 
C o i i n t 11 : f t h e amended c omp1aint in the consolidated matters 
F-13 7 and J ' 198 which a.I leges that the Respondent was convicted 
of the crime of theft in the second degree, that the trial judge 
of Count 11 alleges that the conduct of the Respondent is i n vio-
lation of Rti le 11 , Sect I on t f 2 ) and Cannon 1 , E -r 1 • ] 0 2 f S ) (4) , 
o f t h e R e v i s e d R u 1 e s o f P r o f e s s i o n a 1 C o n d u c t o f t h e tJ !:: a h S t a t e 
B a r , Rule II (a) , Rti les of Discipline of the Utah State Par; and 
Utah State Bar 
The Respondent reserved the right to make an opening state-
r 
Counsel for the Bar reviewed the record and specifically the 
answer o f the Re spondent t< :> the amended comp 1 a int. The Respon-
den t: objected to the characterization of his answer i n paragraph 
2 of the second defense as an admission that he was sentenced on 
Nc v ernt er 2 6 1 9 8:2 
Counsel f' iri: the Bar offered proposed Exhibits 1, 2 and 3 as 
evidence. The Respondent examined the proposed exhibits and the 
R e s p o n d e i I t I l a ; i i i g i : , < :: ! • :: b j e c t: i o i i, E x h i b :i 1: I T c: s 1 2 = , i: i :! 3 were 
admitted and received in evidence• 
Exhibit No, 4 was then marked and offered as an exhibit 
which is the transcript and record on appeal to the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah in the case of State v. Davis 689 P. 2d 5 
(Utah 1984). The Respondent requested time to examine the 
exhibit and the Panel proposed that counsel for the parties 
disclose all their proposed exhibits to each other, have them 
numbered, organized and examined by counsel during a recess. 
Upon resuming the hearing, counsel for the Bar offered 
proposed Exhibit No. 4 consisting of subparts 4a, 4b, 4c and 4d. 
Mr, Davis objected on the grounds that the exhibit is irrelevant. 
The panel ruled that the exhibit would be received into evidence, 
reserving to the panel the discretion to determine the relevancy 
and weight of the evidence; Exhibit No. 4 was admitted. 
Proposed Exhibit No. 5 was marked and offered; the Respon-
dent offered the same objection as to relevancy to proposed 
Exhibit No. 5 and the Panel ruled that the exhibit would be 
received subject to the same reservation of discretion as to 
relevancy and weight. 
Counsel for the Bar then called Mr. Randall Hall as a 
witness. Prior to the examination of Mr. Hall, Bar Counsel 
requested that the panel rule that based on the exhibits the 
Respondent has been convicted of a crime as charged in Count II 
of the Amended Complaint. 
After hearing the arguments of counsel and examining the 
exhibits, the panel ruled that the Bar had sustained its burden 
of proof bv clear and rnnvinrl _-_ „ - j ,b. 
c-:nv: --e * :: * ::me.. * rrrnctior. was entered. 
r 
Davis - . tu;,* .. • G: J -- ^ ssufb .rtsei.u/ ^^ :* *-- •=: 
( - -
the Pane , . reservation ~* -esixncent 3 no renewal 
of - -
Mr. Ha. « . . i^ 'u^d by Counsel f" ^>° Bar,. 
Propose Fy^ *~ j ** ^ T * - * - . ^ *- - --- ~ f i r*s t - ;^r : i r e r ^ : and 
a din i I, 
Mr, H- «- * -examined ry '\: - .,£" - ^rfered 
proposed Exnibx*. xeceiv" -'adence *^  ~u - - ob-
j ection. 'Proposed Exhibi t ] was o ffered by Mr. Davis after 
identification by the witness and received ii i evidence without 
ob jec ti 01 i. 
Examination of the witness was concluded by the parties. 
Members of the panel asked the witness certain questions the 
w i t n e s s ; ; a s e x c u s e d. • • ' • 
Counsel for the Bar then informed the Court that the Bar did 
n o t i n t e n d t o z: a ] ] a n} f i 11 t he r w i t n e s s e s h o we ve r spec: f :i c n • ::> t i c e 
should be taken of the case of state vs. Davis, 
Counse; :-r the Bar having rested, the Respondent was 
r
: - •-• ?esp<. ncent m.oved for dismissal of the complaint on the 
basis oi Luc provisions UL / U - J - 4 0 2 ( 2 ) (b) . After hearing the 
arguments of counsel, examining the statute, the exhibits and 
after considering additional grounds for the Motion to Dismiss as 
stated by the Petitioner that the Bar had failed to sustain its 
burden of proof on the remainder of the charges in Count II, the 
Respondent's motions to dismiss were denied. 
The Respondent made an opening statement in which he renewed 
the pre-trial motions heard by the Panel on prior occasions. 
The Respondent called Jeff Paoletti as a witness: Mr. 
Paoletti was seated and examined by the Respondent. After the 
examination of the Respondent, Counsel for the Bar declined to 
cross-examine Mr. Paoletti. 
The Respondent called Mr. Charlie Joseph as a witness. 
Counsel for Mr. Joseph requested an opportunity to consult with 
Bar counsel with respect .to protective matters regarding Mr. 
Joseph. The Panel briefly recessed and reconvened the hearing 
for further proceedings. 
Counsel for the Bar stated a continuing objection to the 
testimony of Mr. Joseph as being irrelevant to the issues defined 
by the Respondent during his opening statement and on the basis 
that the Respondent was attempting to relitigate the issue of 
guilt or innocence in the criminal matter. After hearing the 
arguments of counsel, the objection of Bar Counsel was overruled 
and the Respondent was permitted to proceed to examine Mr. 
Charlie Joseph based on Rule 23 of the Rules of Integration and 
Management of the Utah State Bar and the case of In Re: Kline D. 
Strong 616 P.2d, 583 (Utah 1980). 
Tl>. Respondent, then examined Mi. Joseph 'Iter examination 
by f-he Respondent, the witness was cross-examined b v counsel for 
t h - r», v ' , (" • i • " '-,•-"' I T M if i ' I1 ' M P S P ] <• T f he Bar tl le 
Respondent examined M i , Joseph based on issues raised during tl: le 
cross-examination lvp p T i counsel, The Panel directed certain 
q uesti :)i: is I i i I h w1 Lness and1 t he Respondent moved that the 
t e s t imon y e1ic i t e d b y t he Pa ne1 b e st ri c ken o r i n t h e a 11 e r-
n a t i T r i= •, 1 : h = , it , 1 i » b e • g :i < r e i i = , i: I c: • p p c • r 1 1 11 i i t} t • :  f i i r t 1: l e i: e: ;: a in i r ,. < = • 
witness, The Responden t received assurance from,, the Panel that 
t h e e n t i r e t ranscript w o i 3 3 d b e i: e a 3 a i: i < ::! r e v I ewe d b e f o r e 
d e c I s i o n I s r e n d e r e d !"' 1 i e P a i i e I a J 1 o w e d t, 11 M H e s p i: ride i I t 
r e - e x a m i n e Mr • J o s e p h , T h e r e a f t e r Mr« • J oseph was e x c u s e d from 
t h e p r o c e e d i n g s . 
"I h e R e s p o n d e n t i n d i c a t e d t h a t h e I n t e n d e d t o I n t r o d u c e one 
mor-;: d o c u m e n t w h i c h c o u n s e ] f o r t h e B a r s t i p u l a t e d c o u I d b e 
ac ! i t'ipi'i, 'Hi*1 ilricuiTiei'i 1 i ' i p in ' eril'Hin H report" prepain-'ii (MI I I » 
F o u r t h D i s t r i c t C o u r t by f-he D i v i s i o n of Aduj t- P r o b a t i o n and 
P a r o l e * 
T h e R e s p o i i d e n t 1 n d i c a t e d t h a t h i s v e r s i o n o f t h e i n c i d e n t 
was adequately explained I n the report • ::)f the DIvision of Adu 1 f 
P r o b a t i o n a n d P a r o 1 e a n d t h e r e f o r e 1 :i. e w o i :i 1 d i i c • ( : 1: e s t i f } ? f t ^  • 
admission c f the stipulated exhibit, the Respondent rested• 
Counsel for the Bar made a ^losing statement, citi rig certain 
cases I in I 111 i i" i < i i nni 11 s < >' I i n :,i I-H >, i i i . : s : .f tl: le f 'ai iel • 
Upon the conclusion of the closing statement of Counsel for the 
Bar, Mr. Davis was invited to make a closing statement. During 
the closing statement by Mr. Davis, certain questions were asked 
by the Panel to clarify the issues Mr. Davis felt were relevant 
for the Panel's consideration. 
The Respondent was permitted to introduce certain additional 
illustrative exhibits which were prepared by him, subject to the 
objection of Bar Counsel as to the foundation for the exhibits. 
After the closing statements of the parties, a spontaneous 
statement was made on the record by Carol B. Davis, the wife of 
the Respondent over the objection of Bar Counsel. Mrs. Davis was 
not sworn, however, the Panel permitted the statement by Mrs. 
Davis. 
At 6:56 p.m. the record was closed after having received all 
exhibits, evidence and statements of counsel. 
Based upon the exhibits, testimony and all of the evidence, 
the Panel makes the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The Respondent is a member of the Utah State Bar and is 
the same person as the Defendant in the case of The State of Utah 
vs. John Shepard Davis, 689 P.2d 5 (Utah 1984) . 
2. The Respondent was convicted of the crime of theft, a 
felony in the second degree and sentenced by the Court pursuant 
to the discretion of the District Court, to a sentence for theft, 
a felony in the third degree. 
3 . ' The s e n t e n c e and c o n v i c t i o n of t h e Responden t were 
appeali-'il hi I In '""up r < MUM iVmrh i"if !!!• -\\\ i n»™ 1 tin-- V • i ? i in r t Hie 
j u ry a, n d t r i a 1 c o u r f: we i: e a, £ f i rme d • 
4 • The Respond e n t e ngage d i r „ c onduc t wh i c h wa s d i s ho n e s t 
a ,:n„ d d e c e i t £ i :i ] 1 : • > a p f:: i: • ::) p i: i a t ,:i i: l g f i 11 i ::i s t : • 1: i i s :: • ; i i i i s = • ' I: 3 ::i : • I: „ • • = :i : • = • 
the property of clients without their consent, by failing t , :» 
d i s c 1 o s e t! ::i) t h e :: ,1 i e n t t h e d i s b u r s eme „n, t o f t h e c 1 i e n t' s fun d s a n d 
attempting to prevent the cl lent from, the discovery o f the 
disbursement of funds and by the use of such funds for personal 
expenditures• 
5. The Respondent introduced no evidence in mitigation of 
tk e conviction of th,e£t or to be considered for the p u r p o s e of 
these oroceedipT<= »nd the claims i n, the complaints herein,, 
Eased •>• foregoing Findings of Fact, the Panel makes the 
i ' i i s a n, • :i R e c o m m e i i d a, t „:i • ::> n : 
1 . 1- r *i , m e • :::),£ theft and the circumstances of the ccn-
v: *-*" +• i - ~ ' ^ e s p o n d e n t const„i„tute conduct, i n v o .1 vi n„g m o r a 1 
t 11 „ 11:: e 11: l e ,R„ e s p o i i d e :i I t: ,:i o 1 a t e d, R i 11 e 2 , S e c t i • ::> i: i • I 
* "- ' - ?e* _ sed Rules of Professional Conduct of the I Jtal i 
State Bar. 
2 • The convic tion o f tl :i„e De f endant o f ti le ::r ime o f the ft 
constitutes a vio 1 ation o f ,Ru 1 e 2 (a,) o f the ,R„u„1„e s o f D I, scI,p 11 n,e 
c i,e Uta h St:a, t e B EII ,:i i i tl la t ti l s • :::::::i: ::i me ; - a s a • :ri: i m< * i n o„] vi i i g 
mo r a 1 t u r p i t u d e . 
3. The Respondent is subject to a ji idgment- of disbarment 
p u r s u a n t t c P a r a g r a p 1 i, 2 3 • J f 1 1 i e „R u 1 e s f : • i: I n t e g r a t i o n a n d M a, n a g e -
ment of the Utah State Bar having been convicted of a crime 
involving moral turpitude. 
4. The Respondent should be disbarred and his name 
stricken from the register of attorneys in the State of Utah* 
5. No mitigating circumstances exist to provide a basis 
for any sanction other than disbarment. 
DATED this / ff day of AJ^(J£&J &lfi— , 1986. 
ADDENDUM K 
(t ) i :: smpla-i ria nt , sha 1 ] ha ^  re the .1:11 :jht to a ppea r before the 
disciplinary panel personally•or through a designated representative to 
make a statement in support of h is or her complaint or in opposition to 
the matters presented by the attorney aga I n s t w 1: 10m : 'ompla I i :i t I :ia s been 
made. This shall not Include direct confrontation of the parties 
ass specif I'M J. I '/ '^i the 
RULE VII 
DISCIPLINE AND SANCTIONS 
(a) Disbarment. Disbarment shall result in the revocatun JI: a.: 
attorney's license to practice law, and in the removal of the disbarred 
a t torney fr IJIII i: ol I • ::: f a t tor ney s ! of tlni e i i i p i i-snie i ' u i r HI mi- hrw L ZV>1 
engage in the practice of law in the State of Utah, 'The Supreme Court 
ha s exc] i i si ve p< swei • to 3rd er disbarment. 
(b) Suspension. Suspension of an attorney shall remove said 
individua 1 as a member < i»f the Bar o I: the Supreme Coi irt in good standing 
iiid shall ranaei: liuiiri ",;u: liei,, nicdpalile ..iiiKi mujud Li 11 e < ;1 i' o iji:aor i ,;i";
 L^<i 
i n the State of Utah during the period of suspension,, The period of 
?nispenn^n iniy ^a *"^  \\\\f f" i inri f r nme Ie°s lun W M H-IIS i w r ^ M ' n . '^u^ 
Supreme Court has exclusive powers to oraei suspension. Any tei/m of 
suspension --. -** stayed by hhe Supreme Court conditioned on M-p 
suspended ~ " • ' aw • «Mli -.'ML.-HJI I JLJIKI a\ 1 .. iidii j IK.J or 
the- staye : -'isziensi active member of the Utan State Bar who is 
minted bv the RoaM t*o TUf>"2i:vi ;w-} hhe 
suspendec ±\~ .. ~*~ .**u assure that the suspended attorney complies 
with the u^ -u-uo . -,-'~* tions of the stayed suspension. 
( i ) I . ispension I Ipoi I p >etiti^ on c .f the Boa r i, or of 
the Committee ; le consent of the Board) filed with the 
Supreme Court, or on it own motion, the Supreme Court may issue ar 
interim order suspending an attorney from the practice of law or 
imposing temporary conditions of probation pending a final 
determination in any disciplinary proceeding. The Supreme Court 
shall have exclusive power to place an attorney on interim 
suspension. If such a petition of the Board is filed prior to, 
concurrently with, or subsequent to the filing of its Findings, 
Conclusions, and Recommendation with the Supreme Court in a 
disciplinary case, such petition shall be supported by affidavits 
and exhibits demonstrating that the attorney has been convicted of 
a crime involving moral turpitude, or is causing great harm to the 
public and/or a client or clients pending final disp&sition of the 
disciplinary proceeding. 
(2) In the event of a petition for interim suspension, the 
Board shall have the burden of proof that the relief sought shculc 
be granted in whole or in part. 
(3) Any order of temporary suspension shall preclude the 
attorney form accepting new cases, but shall not preclude him frcr 
continuing to represent existing clients during the first 3 0 days 
after the effective date of the temporary order; provided that an: 
fees tendered to such attorney for services performed during the 
30-day period shall be deposited in a trust fund from which 
withdrawals may be made only in accordance with restrictions 
imposed by the Supreme Court. 
(4) A temporary suspension order which restricts the 
attorney from maintaining an account against which the attorney 
may make withdrawals, shall serve as a injunction to prevent the 
p i VITIP! 11, •, h hf-reon exc^'")i , n i ^co rdance 
with r e s t r i c t : :r 5 • "sed iy tine supreme Com t 
(5) The Supreme Court shall have exclusive power to 
terminate an I literim si ispensi on. 
(c) Probation Probation may be imposed only in those cases i : i 
wliu.li !, !iet>,'" i i I J U ie likelihood f'haf": Uhe -i t: i- iniey i"'ii nr'.iLh.if. i. ''i" - :i: 1 1 
harm the public during the period of probation and i',;be conditions of 
probat i on ca n 1:: =s a dequately si ipervised The Board may appoint an 
active member :i)f: t i n * Utah Sta te Bar who is I n good s tai iding to 
s" ipervise the a ttorney and to assure that the attorney fulfills the 
conditions • :)f the p i: oh a t i on. 
Probation shall be imposed for a specified period not in excess o: 
conditions of the probation shalJ be s tipulated in writing and may onl' 
be imposed b^ ;r the Supreme Court. 
Probation may be terminated upon 1 ihe fi ] I rig of 3 n affida y i t J ov the 
r sspondent that he has complied with the conditions of probation and a; 
aff Ida"'! o\ ' ii" pi iiJdi'i in'., luyei / umin ilin \- v if iM HI I * n i ni-jer 
necessary. 
If the probation -Mi:ervisor fails t-o file an affidavit, ::=ir 
Counsel shou.J investigate t;; determine whethti Hie L (=bp«. udej -.i« u , 
be fully reinstated 6a i: Counsel may recommend that the respondent be 
ft i liy r e-.ns :a I" •• I Mill i In pet* 'id if rrnh.iM ni IJ rfand'j 1 f i i rpt'ioc 
not t:i exceed two years or that other discipline be ,i]ipn:y I 
(dj i il i"1 Peorimand. For unprofessional conduct, nn -ar^orney 
may be public 1/ i eprimanc id I lie supreme J-art has e x z l i s r f2 OWIJI ; 
impose the reprimand, Such shall be accomplished in writing with the 
ADDENDUM L 
RULE XII 
DISCIPLINARY HEARING BEFORE BOARD 
(b) Evidence. The rules of evidence and procedure applicable to 
the conduct of non-jury civil trials in the District Courts of the 
State of Utah shall govern the hearing on a Formal Committee Complaint. 
A verbatim recording shall be maintained by electronic and/or 
stenographic means. 
